Despite the recent advancement in the medical field, and increased resources for effective physician-patient interaction, practitioners often ignore the patients’ view of their condition in experiencing illness. Currently, limited tools exist to assist physicians in developing necessary skills for effective understanding and interpretation of patients’ illness. The emphases in diagnostic interviews are mostly to treatment and diagnosis and less on communication competencies for medical professionals. The purpose of this qualitative inquiry is to explore interactive competencies in diagnostic interviews and intake protocols.

Qualitative research is helpful in gaining detail and in-depth understanding of any phenomenon about which little is known. In general some elements of a phenomenological sensibility will be applied by including questions on the meaning of experiences for the participants in the study.

A grounded theory approach that is one of the numerous qualitative research approaches largely adopted by researchers in healthcare will be used. 8 participants will take part in the standardized open ended interviews. Participants will include 4 physicians in active practice and 4 staff members from a HR department that provide healthcare services.

During data analysis an inductive and generative analysis method will be used, that will support the trustworthiness of the results of the study. Open coding will be used to label and summarize data into meaningful units. Open coding will help to explore the data in a detailed way by identifying and conceptualizing it.
Axial coding will help to connect different categories and include situations and phenomena in discovering the relationships between different statements. Selective coding will be used to confirm the relationships between different categories. This study will provide a robust description of the experiences of physicians in diagnostic interviews and the administrative staff members in intake protocols.
2. The Transparent Envelope: A Phenomenological Exploration of Virginia Woolf's Fiction

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This paper seeks to explore ways the phenomena of life and theories of being have negated the boundaries that customarily divide our disciplines and fields. Using the work of 20th century philosophers--Henri Bergson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz, and the 20th century writer, Virginia Woolf--I propose to show how their writings, philosophical and fictive, move beyond a reductive scientific view of nature or a romanticized, idealist notion to a view which sees the human, animals, and nature as an all encompassing whole. All present a vision of the human self/subjectivity as an integrated part of a pattern of connected wholeness.

In 1925 Woolf suggested that “Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end.” Her novels present a progressive exploration of that ‘envelope’ in experiments that abandon traditional forms and reveal her desire to portray the human and the non-human or the “more than human world” to use a phrase from David Abrams, one that “brings with it a recuperation of the living landscape in which we are corporeally embedded.” Her fiction makes a turn toward Being, I maintain, following Bergson’s notion of intuition, a “kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique and consequentially inexpressible” (Introduction to Metaphysics, 25). The mind adopts the very movement of the inward life of things (IM 21). Moreover, I will argue
that Woolf moves toward a phenomenological sense of embodied participatory reality which Merleau-Ponty thought (following Husserl’s notion of the life world or Lebenswelt) would open out upon the complex living flesh of the world.

In *Between the Acts*, Woolf’s last novel, her concern with the world reaches its apex, and Merleau-Ponty’s vision of human embeddedness in the flesh of the world provides a foundation for understanding her vision. This novel demonstrates Merleau-Ponty’s position that our active bodily being is the source of thought: “a communication with the world more ancient than thought” (*Phenomenology of Perception* 254). The finale of the novel’s pageant is a tribute to the kinship of the living, both human and nature. As Woolf suggested in her diary, this last novel is about community, with “I” rejected and “we” substituted, anticipating Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the living as “collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity.” In addition, I will underscore the phenomenological tradition, with the thought of Alfred Schutz who viewed the everyday life-world as fundamentally intersubjective. Virginia Woolf’s use of intersubjective meaning, specifically in *Between the Acts*, provides the characters with the means to understand not only action or behavior but the consciousness of another. She orchestrates the intersubjectivity between characters in such a way that unvoiced thoughts are grasped by others, thus extending the concept of intersubjectivity to include the connection to others, the natural world, and all of those within the tapestry of life.
3. Ricoeur’s Phenomenological Constraints on Rational Agency

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According to the dominant theory of action today, action explanation is a form of causal explanation. To explain why an agent acted as she did, on this view, is to lay out the causes of the bodily movement identified as an action. Though the particulars of this causal account differ from author to author, a fairly dominant view sees actions as caused by intentions, which are themselves the effects of a combination of the agent’s beliefs and desires. In this paper I want to examine Christine Korsgaard’s important response to this view. I will argue that her response, while offering an interesting alternative to causalism, cannot succeed without the sort of phenomenological backing developed by Ricoeur in The Voluntary and the Involuntary, particularly the crucial notion of a capability or power to act stored in the body, which provides the crucial medium uniting action, intention, and the agent.

Korsgaard avoids the idea that intentions are causes by denying that the action is anything other than the embodied intention itself. As soon as I decide and form an intention, I am already performing the action, at the very least by avoiding any further actions that would undermine the execution of my decision. The intention does not precede the action, nor does it follow on it. For Korsgaard, the efficacy of my chosen action and its following from my choice are the rational norms governing agency. This means that, in order to be an agent at all, in making a decision I must be committed to both my authorship and execution of that decision. This account effaces the bodily nature of action: the execution of my decision is merely a rational requirement. It is, furthermore, a requirement that I
rationally place on myself, such that I constitute myself as an agent in its fulfillment; I create myself only through the rational requirement of performing the chosen action.

What is needed to maintain the separation of intention from the domain of cause without this slippage into an overly rationalized view of selfhood and efficacy is, as Ricoeur maintained, on the one hand a pure description of deciding and, on the other hand, an analysis of the role of the body—specifically its capability—in decision. Efficacy is, primarily, a bodily rather than a rational requirement. An authentic decision that settles a project (which is itself the content of an intention) relies on the idea of a power to act: one cannot decide to act without an implicit awareness of such power. At the same time, however, that power is not completely internalist: it must be tested in the execution of an action. This allows for a temporal separation between the decision and the action without undermining the necessity of the relation by which the action and the intention are bound together into a unified whole. Furthermore, the agent’s implicit presence in any decision—as the entity that both projects and executes the power to act—can be seen as a pre-rational condition on any recognition of normative requirements on action. Experiencing myself as projecting a capability to act is essential to the ontology of action; positing myself as an efficacious agent, as a normative requirement, is not the ground of agency but rather the explicit bringing out of what is necessarily already present in any decision.
4. Soundscape of Plato’s *Symposium*

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Socrates has been called “the most erotic of philosophers,”¹ and Plato’s *Symposium*, “perhaps the most beautiful”² of the Socratic dialogues. *The Symposium*, an inquiry on the nature of love, is richly evocative of the sensuous. It is said to convey an image of Socrates that links Eros with poetry, hence also bridging the gap between Eros and philosophy. Plato, who has been called the most “poetic” of the philosophers, artfully brings many elements of the sensuous to light. Yet among the most sensuous of elements within the *Symposium* is the elusive temporality and abstract nature of the phenomenon of sound, with its vibratory strands combining in complex, unpredictable, and multifarious ways, unfolding in time whether or not it registers in one’s consciousness. Indeed, though Plato treats the variable permeation of sound in a thematic and purposeful manner, its various expressions can easily and ironically fade in our awareness against the meaning(s) associated with its expression. As I hope to show in this paper, the sonic dimensionalities of Plato’s *Symposium* form a fascinating and compelling architectonic soundscape which brings the sensuous to life, capturing our attention anew and inspiring a fuller appreciation not only of the place of sound within the work but its importance within broader contexts of the ancient world.

5. Irresistible Empathy

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Edmund Husserl holds that an apperceptive transfer of the sense “animate organism” from myself to another takes place in empathy (Einfühlung), here meaning a practical recognizing of the other being as engaged with me as interactive and conscious counterpart, as opposed to the “sympathizing with another” signified in common parlance. Alfred Schutz has argued against Husserl’s account in *Cartesian Meditations* and *Ideen 2* that the differences between myself and the other are so fundamental that the transfer of “animate organism” from myself to another becomes problematic. Schutz asks, for instance, how I could carry out the transfer of localizations of sensations to the other if I am a man and the other a woman. Furthermore, the difference deepens insofar as I experience my own consciousness originarily, from within, and I never have such an experience of the other.

In this paper, I would like to defend Husserl’s view against Schutz’s, but to do so I will have to mount several arguments. In the first place, I will argue that Husserl’s general approach to empathy must be conceived as part of a genetic as opposed to a static, constitutive phenomenology, despite Husserl’s own self-description of what he is doing in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation—a description that has been disputed recently by scholars of his work. If he is not carefully arguing step-by-step for the stages by which we build up the meaning “another animate organism,” but is instead returning to the moment when one first recognizes another animate organism, just as the child becomes familiar with “scissors” and then is able to transfer that sense to anything like a “scissors,” the
emphasis will be on how likenesses immediately evoke sense-transfers as opposed to pointing out the gaps in argumentation that such immediate transfers pass over.

Secondly, I will argue that we need to follow Dorion Cairns’s idea that “the fundamental tendencies of mental life are tendencies to identify and assimilate,” and again these tendencies almost automatically overwhelm our inclination to hold back from making sense-transfers because of the differences present. Thirdly, the fact that such transfers on the basis of similarity are a matter of “passive association” beneath the controlling “I,” as one would expect to be described in a genetic phenomenological, the differences that reflection becomes aware of do not block the assimilative transfer.

Fourthly, the similarities between myself and other animate organisms are massive, particularly insofar as the other governs in its animate organism, mobilizing assorted organs similar to mine as I mobilize my own and responding to circumstances and stimuli in so many ways akin to the ways I would, the differences between us are miniscule and incapable of withstanding the inclination to transfer the sense “animate organism.”

Fifthly, I will argue that we pervasively transpose our self into other positions and that empathy must be seen as part of this fundamental tendency to self-transposition. We do this when our intentional activity in perception “intends-beyond-itself,” anticipating the various positions I could occupy as I venture in to the horizons of the object confronting me or anticipating that the other is having the same kind of experience of the object from his or her perspective if I were there and he or she were here. Likewise in memory I transpose myself into the past, as if I were there experiencing again what I had experienced, though I am really here in the now. Phantasy, too, involves transposing myself into the position of a fictive I,
though this I differs basically from the other given in empathy whose physical body is there before me. Though empathy differs from perception, memory, or phantasy, by its likeness to these acts it is linked to a fundamental, self-transposing dynamism pervasive in consciousness that the lack of originary experience of the other cannot impede.

Finally there is rather constant “validation” of the empathic transfer insofar as other animate organisms continue to behave similarly to my own animate organism and all others and the similarity that prompts the transfer in the first place serves as a continuous “validator” of the sense-transfer. Such constant validation makes the prospect of refraining from the transfer that a rational argument might propose as appropriate appear ridiculous.
6. Family Presence on Rounds and in the ICU

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Family-centered care has become the new mandate in the health care field that includes honoring the patient and families’ perspectives and choices and supporting them in participating in care at the level that they might choose. Involvement of family and friends is one dimension of patient-centered care that focuses on accommodating the significant others that patients rely on in difficult situations. This includes involving them in appropriate decision-making, supporting them as caregivers, making them welcome and comfortable in the care delivery setting, and recognizing their needs and contributions. The Institute of Medicine (2001) emphasized that shared decision-making should be viewed as the primary model for making medical decisions in the intensive care unit. This sharing would assist patients understanding of treatment options including the level of uncertainty of each option as well as how each option fits with their own lifestyle and personal beliefs. Family conferences and/or meetings were one of the recommendations presented under the shared decision-making model. Family presence on rounds is also one of the guidelines instituted for evidence-based best practices for support of families in the delivery of patient-centered care in the intensive care unit. The effects of their presence have been identified as the least studied among all the other aspects of family-centered care in the intensive care unit.

This paper integrates the recommendations for family-centered care from the findings of my phenomenological study about the experiences of the critically ill
patients, their families and nurses in the intensive care unit. A phenomenological approach and Merleau-Ponty's existentials of corporeality, temporality, relationality, and spatiality were used for this study. In-depth, open-ended interviews were conducted and analyzed using van Manen's wholistic, selective, and detailed line-by-line approach. In this presentation, I will focus on two evidence-based practices namely, family presence on rounds and family conferences in the intensive care unit. From this review, nurses and other members of the health care team will better understand the impact of family presence on rounds and family conferences that can affect patient care, both risks and benefits of each. Recommendations for further research on family presence on rounds and family conference and/or meetings in the intensive care unit will be included.
Derrida tells us he often dreamed that a pen would be a “syringe, suction point rather than that very hard weapon with which one must inscribe, incise, choose, calculate take ink before filtering the inscribable ... the blood delivers itself all alone the inside gives itself up and you can do as you like with it, it’s me but I am no longer there…” The paper seeks to interpret this dream, and seeks to demonstrate that this is not ultimately a dream because the pen becomes as syringe and the syringe become a pen. Both merge into each of other in their thinglihood – a thinglihood that itself loses its thinglihood, dragging Derrida into this loss – a loss in which he loses his self-hood. We ourselves are dragged into it and, thereby, lose our selves. These series of losses end up creating a human community – community with things, a community that ends up being neither human nor non human, but in which both merge into one community. Although the point of departure is Derrida’s dream, the paper is not about Derrida and is not necessarily intended to be a contribution to Derrida scholarship. I seek describe a particular perspective on being in the world, a perspective that embraces the sensuous in a way that the sensuous comes through not as matter but as a way of seeing the world.
8. To Defy Limits: Reaching into the Complexity of Religious Identity

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Though many models of identity development commonly used in the field of education rely on linear processes of growth, my dissertation research on religious conversion and intensification suggests that religious identity development, in particular, cannot easily be mapped to these models. Drawn from ten participants representing a wide array of identities related to religion, race, sex, sexuality, gender identity, age, and educational attainment, my phenomenological data suggest that identity development of this nature is better understood when viewed through a lens that hybridizes phenomenology and queer theory.

Specifically, I undertake three major tasks. First, I map out how religious identity has been reified in social science research as static and unitary and offer phenomenological evidence that disrupts this dominant narrative from over 50 years of research. Starting with the work of Allport (1950) and Allport and Ross (1967), these social science researchers have sought to establish causal relationships between religious identity and prejudice. Though they did not seek to establish a “concrete” understanding of religious identity (as their intent was to study prejudice), subsequent research on prejudice reduction has taken religious identity as given from these initial research projects. I trace this development and contest its origins.

Secondly, I offer a poetized redefinition of religious identity overall (using the contested identity possibilities offered through queer theory) to establish a powerful standpoint from which to examine identity development overall, including dominant Christian identity. Modeled on the work of Chang-Ross (2010)
and “racial queerness,” I explore Heideggerian “turning” to theorize religious queerness as a new center between the binaries of religious identity.

And lastly, I explore pedagogical possibilities for including insights from religiously queer identity as a way for understanding social difference. My first concern is helping educators understand how religiously queer people might “show up” in a classroom setting, particularly focusing on the lived existentials of body, time, space and relationship. Additionally, I offer a variety of ways to use this difference as a gift of perspective to learning, including a reconceptualization of identity within the setting of intergroup dialogue as phenomenological “cohabited space” to build solidarity and alliances for progressive social action.

This session will particularly interest scholars who are interested in religious identity (and identity constructs, in general). It is a presentation located in the interdisciplinary scholarship found in schools of education with an emphasis on the theoretical interactions across phenomenology, queer theory, critical theory, and theories of educational practice.
9. An Example of Research in Police Psychology: A Phenomenological Approach

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A human science guided by a descriptive phenomenology is important to understanding the psychology of the emergency responder. Public safety psychology tends to be absorbed in various other areas of study such as criminology, psychology of public services, and social psychology. Mainstream methodologies have been employed to study police and fire issues that range from macro-level to micro-level analyses. Actually, these studies have provided insight to many issues guiding management, training, and public policy pertaining to these essential social services. Police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians (EMTs) are out in our communities performing the daily functions of crisis prevention and mitigation. But the dominant methodologies, guided by the natural sciences’ values and procedures, can only situate these important people as objects of study (the means) to serve as abstracted bureaucratic ends. Of course, the findings of these studies have been a valuable start to understanding the emergency services personnel, organizations, and culture. But the dominant methodologies grounded in philosophical empiricism have scrubbed out the voice and perspective of the public safety official in such studies. Psychologists and sociologists have both commented on the dubiousness of the results of these kinds of research methods (Giorgi, 1970; Mills, 1959). I am proposing that the emergency services provide populations of people who have rich work experiences that need elucidation for their own use, but also so that the public they serve may have access to a better understanding of what their working experience is like.
When guided by a descriptive phenomenology, a more comprehensive psychological method of studying the public safety employee’s work experience is made available. Natural sciences frame the study of human affairs in a relationship of the scientist as the objective observer peering into whatever fits into his or her Petri dish under the microscope. This seems analogous to investigating a crime without taking statements from those involved (victims and accused) is what the mainstream methods do. The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology provides access to the participant’s lived-experience through his or her naïve account of the incident or situation (Giorgi, 2009). Moreover, the method is scientifically rigorous through its system of methodical steps that provide a critical analysis for general findings of the phenomenon (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). This involves our assuming the phenomenological attitude and bracketing our own biases so that we can have a fresh look at the data and “see” it as it presents itself (Giorgi, 2009). By adequately describing the structure as seen phenomenologically, we have something that we can critically discuss in terms of what it means for its general applicability in the work of public safety professionals.

As an example, I am providing a phenomenological psychological study of police training in simulated lethal encounters. The study demonstrates the methods meaningful power to bring the participants’ perspective to light and help us to understand their lived-experiences in such intense training contexts. It demonstrates how powerful this method might be for studying real-world crisis that emergency responders live-through in everyday life.
We will discuss here the tension between new media and narratology and the case in point of this tension would be cinema. Our thesis would be that new media have to do with illusion, basically with illusion and only derivatively with imagination; on the contrary, the field of literature is just imagination, not illusion at all. If it is so, something must be wrong with the pretence of narratology to be the adequate theoretical schema in order to understand every cultural phenomenon, especially in the case of new media. We have to insist on the distinction between illusion and imagination. In fact, literary theoreticians do mostly not consider it. On the other hand, it is used to say of cinema that it is fiction, and indeed literature is fiction, but cinema is much more than fiction, it is illusion. Let us think of painting. For example, when one looks at Delacroix’s painting *Liberty leading the people* one sees a woman, holding a banner and a lot of people behind her. One sees that. One does not merely imagine that. But when one does not see the painting and merely reads or listens to a description of the painting one has to imagine it. And that is what one always does when one reads a literary work: one does not see anything but merely imagine something. On the contrary, when one sees a painting one does not imagine something at first but one sees something. The same is true of cinema. In fact, phenomenologically one has to strictly differentiate imagining from having an illusion, even if both modes of consciousness relate to fictions. In seeing both a figurative painting and in a common movie shot one sees something in the mode of aesthetic illusion, and
aesthetic illusion is a mode of what Husserl calls image-consciousness (Bildbewusstsein). On the other hand, certainly image-consciousness is not intuition, which phenomenologically is thing-consciousness, but at any rate image-consciousness is something completely different from sign-consciousness, and, obviously, the aesthetic experience corresponding to literature is a mode of sign-consciousness. Thus, phenomenologically, the aesthetic experience corresponding to a narrative movie is something completely different from the aesthetic experience corresponding to a literary work. On the other hand, narratology follows the mode of literary experience in order to explain all media, considering them “texts,” and this includes the new media, too. For this reason the leading analytical category postulated by narratology for examining new media is “hypertext.” Nevertheless, the aesthetic experience corresponding to new media is much more a mode a image-consciousness than a mode of sign-consciousness, what shows that there is a tension between the theoretical apparatus of narratology and the new media.
How do we encounter the Other in resistance to our will and as adversaries? How do these experiences differ from the Other who is initially opposed to us but is experienced as one we can tolerate or even care about? Constructions and deconstructions of the personhood of others is a subject critical in examining the differences between tolerant, welcoming, and hospitable responses, on the one hand, versus intolerant, hostile, and violent responses on the other. Such differences seem to lie on a continuum between empathy and altruism at one end and dehumanization and destruction on the other. Thus interpreting how persons are perceived at different places on this continuum is critical for a range of issues and opportunities including increasing respect for human rights, preventing outbreaks of mass atrocities, and post-conflict reconciliation. In this paper I focus on experiences that enable agents to position themselves closer to the empathic and altruistic end of the continuum. I examine the contributions of Mohandas Gandhi, J. Glenn Gray, and Thich Nhat Hanh toward the construction of the Other as objects of care and compassion and the self as an altruistic Samaritan. The driving question concerns the elements of lived experience and self-understanding that enable individuals to be peaceable and capable of choosing, non-violent, and altruistic behavior. Despite the diversity of the life worlds of Gandhi, Gray, and Nhat Hanh, all three were philosophical and religiously reflective and practitioners of or advocates for nonviolence. A study of their thought reveals the need in human life for a happy, or eudaimonistic balancing of polar opposites around
which conscience and consciousness are constituted: especially the facticity and immediacy of the concrete versus the transcendent and the abstract, and the antinomy between awareness of self as dominant center of action versus selflessness against the horizons of one’s experience. Thus this investigation strongly suggests that those who are most peaceable and altruistic are able to construct and to direct their own awareness of self presence in their experiences so as not to be threatened by awareness of the antinomies, or contradictions, which define the frameworks for human experience. Moreover, they have learned how to relate to the presence of others as a second self. This phenomenological account thus offers a deeper explanation of the empirical research in the social and behavioral sciences of the altruistic personality. Empirical studies purport to demonstrate the presence in altruists of a distinctive personality structure characterized by the “extended self” and strong connection with the ideal of a common humanity.
In this paper, I trace the evolution in Husserl's thinking on analytic judgments, drawing attention to the subtle but decisive shift that occurs between the *Logical Investigations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. I begin by making note of an apparent inconsistency in Husserl's formulation of analyticity in the *Logical Investigations*. In the Third Investigation, Husserl distinguishes between 'analytic laws' and 'analytically necessary propositions'. Analytic laws are "unconditionally universal propositions" which are free from "all assertions of individual existence". Analytically necessary propositions, on the other hand, are "empirical applications" of analytic laws. The inconsistency enters with the relation between the propositions and their associated laws. According to Husserl, analytically necessary propositions permit of "complete formalization". By replacing all empirical content with the formal category 'something', one can transform analytic propositions into analytic laws. As it turns out, however, this formalization is not possible, or at least not in any of the examples that Husserl cites. In each case, the substitution of formal for empirical content results in statements which are neither analytic, nor true.

Departing from previous commentators, I propose that this inconsistency is not a matter of mere sloppiness on Husserl's part. Instead, I suggest that his equivocal formulation of analyticity marks out a pair of distinct commitments. On the one hand, Husserl wants to capture the objectivity of analytic statements—the fact that certain logical laws have an a priori validity. On the other hand, Husserl wants to capture the subjective dimension of analyticity—the fact that we are
compelled, when faced with certain complex ideas, to draw out the concepts or relations implied therein. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl does not manage to reconcile these different dimensions, because he incarnates them in propositions that are themselves heterogeneous. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, however, Husserl does manage to reconcile the objective with the subjective, by recognizing that they represent different aspects of a single class of propositions.

In short, then, my claim is that Husserl ultimately departs from the strictly formal-logical theory of analyticity developed in the *Logical Investigations*, to embrace a view of analyticity that encompasses both the formal-logical and the subjective. Rather than merely an objective law corresponding to judgments in the abstract, analyticity comes to be seen in terms of a correlation between objective and subjective laws of judgment. Recognizing that we are still at this level in the domain of formal logic, I give over the remainder of my paper to the question of what a properly transcendental theory of analyticity might look like. That is, what are the processes whereby certain propositions are constituted as necessarily true? What is the role of eidetic variation in the constitution of analytic judgments? Is there perhaps a sense in which the idea of transcendental constitution weakens, or is in conflict with, our standard expectations regarding analyticity? I conclude with some brief remarks on the way in which Husserl's mature theory of analyticity might respond to some of the impasses in which contemporary discussion around analyticity finds itself.
This paper addresses the validity of Phenomenology's reliance upon Husserl’s intuition of essences in terms of its general cross-cultural and interdisciplinary applications as well as in terms of its specific applications to the field of Psychology. Additionally, the latest neuropsychological research in regard to this subject, is included where relevant herein. The basis of this Husserlian study reflects that the researcher, in returning to the things themselves through an intuition of their essences, has at her disposal two singly necessary but insufficient principles which, together, are necessary and sufficient for successful phenomenological study: 1) the ontological oneness of life, albeit invisible at times to the researcher; and 2) the epistemological necessity of the "experiential" way in the valid study of life (Husserl, 1913/1989, p. 285).

In regard to the first principle, the transpersonal and holistic Husserlian approach emphasizes the universality of human beings: "There is no separation of mutual externality at all for souls in their own essential nature [my italics]" (Husserl, 1936/1954, p. 255). Therefore, in terms of Psychology, Husserlian holistic thought claims a oneness in the essence of human nature, which supports his claim that his method of intuiting essences is perfectly valid in the investigation of phenomena because "In an amazing fashion, [the individual's] intentionality reaches into that of others and vice versa" (Husserl, 1936/1954, p. 254). Moreover,
neurobiological research confirms this statement by Husserl, through its findings that our physical brain patterns, called neuronal patterns, do indeed mirror our companions’ brain patterns when we engage in relationship with those companions. Our Mirror Neuron System (MNS), as it is called, manifests as our brain’s neuronal activity when we empathize with our environment as though we are experiencing what our counterpart (with whom we are empathizing) does. Allan J. Hamilton, M.D., (2009), a professor of neurosurgery and psychology, included the latest research on the so-called human Mirror Neuron System (MNS) in his work (p. 46). Hamilton also quoted Aristotle’s statement that “he [the human] is the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons” (p. 45). The point is that, we have a tendency to imitate influences, and therefore, we note two important points in connection with this subject. First, the universal [my italics] manifestation of the human MNS appears to indicate that Husserl was correct in his claim that human nature is one in its essence, at least in this important regard, since this universality is a reflection of oneness. Second, the oneness reflected by the human MNS is also emphasized by Husserl; for certainly that which has no separation is part of a whole, as follows: "There is no separation of mutual externality at all for souls in their own essential nature" (Husserl, 1936/1954, p. 255).

The MNS research in the field of Neuropsychology also appears to provide supporting evidence for Husserl’s statement that the individual’s intention “reaches into” that of others and vice versa (Husserl, 1936/1954, p. 254); since the requisite oneness for such a process is supported by these findings. Moreover, this oneness would naturally extend to everything, and indeed Husserlian thought is in accord with this paradigm, as the following discussion indicates.
Storytelling is one of our oldest forms of communication and it is one of the most powerful, accessible tools available to educators. Storytelling is so ingrained in us that we even ascribe to inanimate objects the ability to tell the stories of our lives. Narrative is the way we make meaning and memories. We understand our experiences and our lives through our stories. Neuroscience, the studies of consciousness, psychology and the development of self all concern themselves with narrative.

A great deal of research has gone into the benefits of storytelling for student listeners. My hermeneutic phenomenological research centers on the teacher teller, the question of the essence of what it means to teach using storytelling. It is intended to “let be seen” what lies behind the question: What is the lived experience of teachers who tell stories to their students?

This paper presents several of the essential meanings and understanding revealed by this study; themes, such as storytelling as pedagogical power and responsibility, help to uncover what it means to be a teacher who used storytelling in the classroom.
Human consciousness transcends objective reality of the physical world, but ironically the consciousness itself is product of the communicative creative process of forces at work on physical matter. Physical matter’s intentionality creates consciousness, not a consciousness solely for biological perpetuation, but consciousness capable of contemplating self and alterity, other’s consciousness of self, and both contemplating self with intentionality of will as purpose in time. That dynamic of alterity and self necessitates perceiving external and internal time. Internal concepts are timeless, but the activity of perceiving takes external time. The philosophy of time in Derrida’s treatment of the gift of time appears to contradict scientific time, yet even Steven J Gould establishes external time has both the metaphorical qualities of both arrow and cycle. Nevertheless external time is measured by change, objects moving and changing while internal time poses holistic proprieties, morphing, melting, alchemistic perceptions of time. Husserlian objective worldly time appears separate but instead is reflected in internal time, a phenomenon much more akin to natural time and multi-verse theory, with a multiplicity of actions occurring not linearly but holistically with a qualia type speed.

Imaginings and recollections seem inescapably fixed in a past, present, future dynamic, which supports Newtonian linear objective measurement of time, often calculated by the science of geological Deep Time. Again, however, we deceptively impose mathematical concept of counting time rather than the multi dimensional geometrical characteristics of relativity in space/time continuum. Thus
the worldly/objective time has been highly subjective to a certain physical point in space/time compared to the internal time able to grasp a more natural time within a holistic being space/time continuum. We find internal time-consciousness is not counterintuitive to perpetuation, but a necessary ability to perceive existence beyond a restrictive individualistic even human-centric view to an ontology of ‘being’ with and within the physical space/time continuum.

The paper includes a brief examination of Newtonian time, deep time, and time’s cycle, the traditional measurement of time based in appearances of movement followed by a re-visioning of Cartesian perception of physical matter’s communicative forces of constant motion. Husserlian time-consciousness and Bergsonian Virtual Coexistence are foundations for a phenomenological reduction of the transhumanistic experience of time, transcending five thousand years of human-centric ontological ‘being with’ to transhumanistic examination of ‘being within’ quantum holism and Simon P. James’s phenomenological environmental theory. Human consciousness as appearance transcending the communicative forces of matter and space results in deterministic product of the communicative forces of matter in space for aesthetic experiential perpetuation of holistic consciousness.
16. What happens when they don’t know squat? Exploring disconnects between well done and well said in certification assessments of personal trainers

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Working as a fitness professional requires the trainer to be able to give clear, concise, consistent and detailed verbal instructions, demonstrate the exercise not only without error, but also with exemplary technique, and observe and detect errors in the client’s movement pattern. Before Personal Trainers and other fitness professional are permitted to work with “real people”, they must demonstrate proficiency at a level that grants them certification. Hence, trainers must be assessed by a designated and recognized assessor and pass that assessment before they are unleashed on the public. As a practical assessor, I have the opportunity to observe trainers in the assessment context, a site where one might expect that a prospective candidate for certification would be well prepared. Strangely enough, there are as many candidates who arrive with seemingly no preparation as those who seem to have done preparation. In my experiences in the assessment context, I have noticed two sites of disconnect between what the fitness professional says and does.

First, in the lived relation – that is between the trainer’s body and expressing bodily movements in language for another (usually a novice). Second, in the lived body – that is, between the lived body and that body as a source of immediate insight for the task at hand. A preliminary analysis proposes that practical assessment forces the fitness professional to make the absent body present. There
is a disconnect (ostensibly) because of the familiarity the trainer has with his body and the familiarity with the movement being taught. Trainers seem to forget what it is like to be a novice in terms of the movement pattern and are unable to explain and/or demonstrate the movement pattern, so that the novice is successful. To circumvent this typical and frequently observed error during assessment, course conductors (ie, professional who prepare trainers for assessment) encourage prospective trainers to create a verbal script to ensure that the safety and dignity of a prospective client are accounted for and protected. It continues to be surprising and disappointing, then to witness not only the less than pristine demonstrations of technique, but also to experience the ongoing performances of disconnect between what is known and what is done, and what is done and what is said.

The title of this paper is drawn from a recent assessment carried out by the paper’s author. As an assessor and conductor, I participated in the preparation of the trainers wanting to be assessed and then assessed a particular young man in the final stages of the certification process, that is, he had passed his theory exam and was then participating in his practical assessment, which entails teaching and demonstrating four exercises: a machine based cardio-vascular activity (examples would be a treadmill or an exercise bike), a squat, a bench press and one other resistance exercise chosen by the assessor. Script prepared, the young man nevertheless delivered it in a wooden fashion with accompanying minimal technique. Further, when I proceeded to carry out his instructions, he failed to notice a glaring error I had deliberately included in my “novice” simulation. This is when an assessor has to decide if this person will compromise the dignity and safety of a potential client. In this case, I believed that, literally, he didn’t know squat.
While I am generally easy with failing unprepared prospective trainers, I continue to agonize over how to prepare these (usually) well-motivated young people for assessment. I have decided that a phenomenological analysis of the assessment process, following the leading clue of disconnect as the mundane ground of my engagement, might yield valuable pedagogic clues for more meaningful and relevant preparation for assessment, the overall benefit being more meaningfully engaged personal trainers. The description of the assessment experience and an analysis based in lifeworld existentials (eg, lived, body, space, time and relation) will form the basis of my paper and presentation.
In the summer of 2009, Fielding Graduate University introduced a course called Embodiment of Knowledge. A collaborative effort between students and faculty, this doctoral level offering consisted of an 11-week online group forum, an intensive weekend face-to-face workshop, and an independent study component. The overview portion is based on a model of interdisciplinary scholarship, including a module dedicated to phenomenology’s perspective. This purpose of this paper is to describe the course’s interdisciplinary model of inquiry. In it, phenomenology occupies a role parallel to traditional disciplines, along with more established fields such as biology, psychology, and sociology. I suggest that the model can be applied to innumerable topics, and constitutes an approach for interdisciplinary teaching and inquiry that has pedagogical application for lower as well as higher education.
18. Alfred Schutz, Equality and the Meaning Structure of City Parks

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In his essay “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World” Schutz points out how the in-group and out-group status meaning of the term “equality” is an important element to be unpacked before any understanding of equality can be analyzed. Schutz as the preeminent sociological phenomenologist has provided a rich phenomenological framework from which the social world can be engaged.

This essay seeks to apply Schutz’s phenomenological method to the rhetorical meaning of a community dispute over the meaning of its city parks. The author has worked as a community partner in an economically depressed inner city neighborhood in the mid-Atlantic United States. The community has lost a number of its public goods during the past decade. In particular a source of contention has been the public parks. The community sees their parks as one of the last remnants of a communal space. The parks are constantly being used in particular by youth who often don’t have anywhere else to go. Despite their use, the community sees their parks in a state of decay, while the neighboring parks in more affluent and white neighborhoods receive more than adequate attention.

The city sees the parks as a drain on their shrinking budget and in particular see the parks in this predominately minority neighborhood as needing an exceptional amount of upkeep compared to neighboring areas. City bureaucrats see the population in the neighborhood shrinking and identify more pressing needs than maintenance of city parks. There also is some confusion about which office
actually is in control of what particular elements (such as programs, equipment, maintenance, litter, etc).

This paper begins with Schutz’s call to examine the different rhetorical meanings that both in and out groups equate to the notion of “park.” One will see that the city and the community do not “play” in the same parks. However, Schutz would not allow us to stop with the mere different linguistic meaning of the interpretation of social groups. Schutz’s analysis was not merely deconstructive, but instead provided a constructive phenomenology of social action always grounded in the lived situation. Schutz’s phenomenology emphasizes “working” in the social world over the linguistic. This “work” is indicative of the rich existential character that Maurice Natanson correctly attributed to Schutzian phenomenology.\(^3\) I plan to employ not only the situated sociological elements of Schutz’s work to analyze the “park dispute,” but the philosophical and transcendental character of his rich writings. Following Natanson’s clue to investigate the Kierkegaardian “indirect communication” in Schutz I read the park dispute not as a linguistic “misunderstanding,” but instead see the disappointment of the city as a failure of communicative responsiveness.

Whenever one reads internal histories of psychology what is covered is the establishment of a lab by Wundt in 1879 as the initiating act and then the breakaway movements of the 20th Century are discussed: Behaviorism, Gestalt Theory, Psychoanalysis, and most recently, the Cognitive revival. However, Aron Gurwitsch developed a perspective noted by Cassirer and first described by Malbranche, which dates the founding of psychology at the same time as that of physics in the 17th Century. This external perspective shows the dependency of psychology upon the concepts, methods and procedures of physics and the natural sciences in general up until the present time. This development has blocked the growth of psychology and has assured its status as a minor science. Gurwitsch argues that phenomenological philosophy can provide an independent founding for psychology that frees it from the influence of physics and the natural sciences and gives it an authenticity it has been forever seeking but never finding as a naturalistic science. Some clarifying thoughts concerning this phenomenologically grounded psychology will be offered. In addition, the difficulty and arduousness of developing it in our contemporary intellectual climate will be emphasized.
My paper, drawn from my book project tracing the history of phenomenological ethics in Central Europe from its founder Edmund Husserl through its reception in East Central Europe by dissident thinkers such as Jan Patočka and Karol Wojtyła, examines Czech philosopher Jan Patočka’s phenomenology as a philosophy of history concerned with European decline and renewal. Patočka saw the crisis of European culture reflected in two World Wars, a Cold War standoff, the rise of totalitarian politics, and the decolonization movement. I will consider the gradual expansion of Patočka’s concept of worldliness from an early phenomenological framework for human action and transcendence into an increasingly meta-historical (though still phenomenological) analysis of the twentieth century, which he viewed as progressively degenerate. I will also examine his program for ethical and social rejuvenation based on a renewed awareness of human freedom and transcendence. The heightened political – or perhaps anti-political – currency of Patočka’s analysis first emerged in manuscripts written before the Prague Spring outlining what he saw as an incipient post-European world; but his worldly concern intensified during the dark years of normalization, until he chose finally to endorse the dissident organization of his followers Václav Havel and Jiří Hájek rather than retire into bitter silence. Although his final role as spokesman for Charter 77 and human rights in Czechoslovakia did not derive self-evidently from an earlier philosophical program, Patočka did adapt Husserl’s examinations of the lifeworld as well as the social investments of interwar German phenomenology to place ethics and worldly
engagement at the center of phenomenological analysis and the human experience.\textsuperscript{4} His trajectory demonstrates that phenomenology, at least in Eastern Europe, was very much a social philosophy.

\footnote{Commentators such as Aviezer Tucker and Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, I argue, make the connection too direct.}
21. Teaching Phenomenology through Highlighting Experience
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For the last five years I have struggled with finding effective ways to teach phenomenological research to undergraduates. In undertaking this task I have turned to Merleau-Ponty’s memorable preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962). He argued that “phenomenology can be practiced and identified as a manner or style of thinking, that it existed as a movement before arriving at a complete awareness of itself as a philosophy” (viii). I think Merleau-Ponty would agree that phenomenology is a style not only of thinking but also of attending to experience, and, within the context of psychology and psychotherapy, of acting. Further, he wrote “We shall find in ourselves, and nowhere else, the unity and true meaning of phenomenology” (viii). This implies that phenomenology makes sense and comes alive for us only insofar as we take it up at a personal as well as an intellectual level. Thus in my teaching, I strive to help students them appropriate this tradition as an attitude, a way of seeing and thinking, and as a practice they can connect with on a personal basis rather than just as a theoretical perspective. By *highlighting experience* I am not only referring to the students’ research practice, but also to our collective reflection on experience as a source of understanding. This emphasis on the experiential is both tricky and necessary because the tendency in much of higher education and in our society to overlook or devalue experience, a tendency that is aggravated by the increasingly frenetic pace of our lives.

I believe that phenomenology makes sense intuitively even though much of its language is esoteric. Appeals to experience as evidence and calls for a return to
the lifeworld are recurring threads in the work of phenomenologists. It is with precisely with respect to experience that phenomenological and traditional psychology part ways. Although in agreement about the importance of moving beyond conventional wisdom or common sense, they differ about where one goes when one moves “beyond.” At its best, phenomenology deepens our appreciation for the depth and nuances of experience, whereas traditional psychology gives priority to theory and technique over experience thereby fostering an overvaluation of technical expertise.

Based on the assumption that phenomenology is not just a style of thinking, but also of perceiving and acting, this presentation shows how through specific assignments and practices phenomenological research can become personally as well as professionally meaningful for students. Disciplined practice helps students to attend to experience even as this requires going “against the grain.” First, by working together in groups, the phenomenon under study is more likely to come alive for the student researchers and articulating the core of a phenomenon no longer seems so daunting. Second, the practice of phenomenology helps students to recognize that slowing down and giving their full attention to experience is restorative, productive, and satisfying. Finally, they have the opportunity to see how systematic methods of data analysis can move them beyond “egocentricity” and into a genuine understanding of another’s world.
During a hot spring day, Siddhartha Gautama sat under a bodhi tree, cross-legged and relaxed. Suddenly a flurry of visions obstructed his mind--blood curdling screams of brothers impaled on each other’s swords, the smell of sweaty musk and desperation of women being raped, the dissolution of society into a chaotic struggle for food and wealth. Siddhartha was unperturbed, and accepted the hostile images into his blossoming worldview by simply pointing one long finger into the soil.

The preceding story, summarized from the Buddhacarita, about the enlightenment of the Buddha is centuries old and tells of a man accosted by what could be called psychotic hallucinations or anxiety by contemporary psychiatrists. Nevertheless, there seems to be a major difference between the experience of a psychotic/anxious person and that of the spiritual Buddha. Furthermore, the nature of the Buddha and other powerful figures allows them to endure great fear without being fettered. What allows two people to witness the same event and have two vastly different experiences, one traumatized and the other enlightened?

In “Event and Experience” (1930), Erwin Straus explores this very question. He determines that the difference lies within the “greatness” of a person’s nature and “the historical place” where the person finds herself or himself. In this paper, I explore a slight expansion on Straus’s phenomenological views about personality types and reactions of each to existentiell meanings. Next, I indicate some of the phenomenological aspects of Siddartha Gautama’s, the Historical Buddha, life-
history during his enlightenment process. Finally, I analyze his transformation from an anxious man to an enlightened leader of millions.

Through the phenomenological explanation of Erwin Straus, the reason that Siddhartha experiences a corpse differently--in his famous chariot ride that launched his mystic searching--is clearer: Siddhartha did not have sufficient subjective readiness. Through an analysis of his life, I argue that Siddhartha increased his subjective readiness to the existentiell meaning, “finitude,” to the point that when approached by the thematic content, in the form of Mara, he was able to not only conquer his fear, but also make sense of the existentiell meaning of his entire life history. A question that Straus’s method does not answer is whether a person has a quality or qualities at birth that predisposes them towards particular subjective readiness. An interesting direction to which this paper points is the differences between a person having a mystical experience as opposed to an anxiety attack or even a psychotic break.
Meursault, the protagonist in Albert Camus’ *The Stranger*, believes that the reflective life is not worth pursuing. Also, rejecting the sacrifice of Jesus and denying the existence of God, he asserts that life is not worth the trouble of living it. Yet, as a condemned murderer awaiting execution, he seems to find the inner peace to accept the alleged indifference of things. In doing so, Meursault appears to some readers to become a modern Sisyphus, a rebel with a cause, a courageous man who lives a meaningless life and dies a happy death. By means of the existentialist hero Meursault, thus the reading, Camus has bestowed philosophical respectability on the view that ‘life is absurd’.

In this paper, I challenge this interpretation by suggesting that there is a sustainable reading of *The Stranger* according to which, far from endorsing Meursault’s absurdist worldview, Camus is inspiring the readers to rise to a level of reflection higher than that of Meursault, from which his views can be critically regarded, judiciously examined, and ultimately rejected as philosophically inadequate. More precisely, I suggest that there is a tenable explication of *The Stranger* according to which Camus is not defending Meursault’s absurdist worldview but reducing it to the absurd. Yet, in proposing that it is possible to understand Meursault differently from how he does himself, I am not speculating that understanding *The Stranger* depends on understanding Camus better than he did himself, for example, by retrieving his original intent in creating his chief character. To the contrary, my focus is on the possible hermeneutical effect of the text on the readers and on their potential hermeneutical responses to it. I do concede, however,
that my reading also amounts to an attempt to understand Meursault differently from the way in which Camus apparently did.
The paper is a discussion of the process of using a teaching exercise project to add “aesthetic communication” as an aspect of “interpersonal communication” in a college course. In addition, the use of phenomenological method is taught as a key ingredient in the comprehension of learning how to communicate at the interpersonal level. To illustrate the classroom experience, I first discuss the history of phenomenological analysis (Description, Interpretation, Evaluation) in the discipline of Communicology. Second, I discuss the twelve page workbook produced as a textbook supplement for students and instructors in a sophomore level *Interpersonal Communication* class. The primary purpose of the workbook and direct learning experience is to train users in applied phenomenological analysis of perception and expression modalities. The secondary purpose is to produce research capta that can in turn be reported as an applied phenomenological research project by the instructor. As pedagogy, this process is illustrated in the handbook per se with a phenomenological Description, Reduction, and Interpretation of a narrative description (capta) taken from an essay written by the French painter Julian Levi. As research, the process is illustrated by “Silent Science: On the Semiotic Phenomenology of Cultural Media (Art vs. Television)”, a publication resulting from my phenomenological analysis of the student produced data.
Semiotics was one of the pre-eminent modes of analysis and theoretical discourse during what Dudley Andrew has called the Imperial Age of Cinema Studies. Despite its subsequent loss of steam its legacy is still present among scholars nowadays. Using phenomenological concepts like intentionality, intersubjectivity, the *gestalt* and the brief, albeit important commentaries of Maurice Merleau Ponty on cinema – including newly transcribed lecture notes from the BNF papers – I will venture an appraisal of film semiotics and the meaning-making process of film criticism in general. My ultimate goal is to explore the triangular ‘push and pull’ between: the stylistically and semantically embedded ‘intention’ of filmmakers in their films, the critically imposed interpretation and the perceptual reception of the film by the audience that completes the circuit of the cinematographic apparatus. A more holistic, ‘Gelassenheit’ alternative will be put forth at an attempt to begin remediying the “need-to-know-the-meaning-of” attitude that any ‘text’-based field like film studies often assumes. Paradigmatic members of the art-cinema canon such as Dreyer’s *Gertrud* and Bergman’s *The Silence* will be employed to demonstrate the proposed approach.
This paper is the first in a three-part study in which I develop a phenomenological framework that can be applied to the systematic analysis of mysticism. The present publication concerns the lifeworld of the mystic.

The centeredness of enquiry on the possibilities of knowledge contained in immediate experience, is shared by mysticism and phenomenological philosophy. But is it the same phenomenology? Different as they are in many aspects, phenomenology and mysticism certainly share the understanding that direct, unmediated awareness of the contents of one’s consciousness is the key to answering the questions that they pose. But beyond that premise, the phenomenological approach has a very different positioning in each discipline. While the knowledge by presence is taken for granted as a valid form of knowledge in mysticism, in philosophical phenomenology it is advocated reflectively as an epistemological principle. Apparent similarities in the internal procedures and practices have encouraged attempts to equate the phenomenological aspects of mysticism with philosophical phenomenology. I would like to dispute the attempts to equate philosophical phenomenology and mysticism on the grounds that a) the consciousness of mysticism or meditation and the consciousness of systematic philosophical investigations are not the same in their telos or in their structures, and therefore cannot be equated; b) the phenomenology in mysticism and the various types of philosophical phenomenology should be distinguished with regard to the features of their specific
phenomenological methods; and c) the spontaneity of mystical intuition is different from systematic phenomenological investigations in philosophy.

Phenomenology of mysticism is a complete system in its own right; it is both a method of practice and an internal framework for a mystic’s map of consciousness. Consequently, phenomenological psychological or philosophical analysis of mysticism addresses a modified experience—though it is, however, natural for a mystic. Because it is not, structurally, the usual natural experience, it requires an adaptation of the phenomenological framework used for analysis; the usual philosophical-phenomenological methods of dealing with experience do not apply. This problem was addressed by the attempts to integrate approaches of philosophical phenomenology and mystical experience, and to position his analysis in a sort of universal phenomenological view. In my opinion, this does not entirely work because the horizons of awareness, the foci of direct intuition in different phenomenologies, resist such attempts at fusion.

In order to carry through the systematic comparisons between philosophical phenomenologies and the experience-based/direct-intuition-based approach in mysticism, the analysis presented here draws not only on philosophical concepts and mystical texts, but on interviews with practicing mystics (N > 1000) in different traditions and cultures. I will present the results of this analysis such as the structures of mystic’s lifeworld, and the positioning of visible and invisible, in comparison with a natural attitude lifeworld. Based on this analysis, I will draw a sketch of philosophical phenomenological procedure proper with regard to the analysis of such a modified life-world as the one inherent to the mystic.
In order to establish a deep as opposed to shallow ecology, Arne Naess borrows concepts from the Yogic tradition, among other places, in order to establish a widened concept of self that is beyond the confines of this body, needs, and perspective, but inclusive of the surrounding world. As such, when we view non-human animals and the non-human world in general, we must realize “That art thou.” As we move from narrower concepts of self to wider a kind of identification with nature is taking place, and one that is not an undifferentiated unity.

In this presentation, I will show how Husserlian phenomenology can offer a deep ecological position similar in many ways to that of Naess also through self-realization in three different areas: 1. A critique of modern culture and narrow ecology; 2. A constitutive return to the lifeworld; and 3. An exposition of being-with the non-human other. In the first case, we will consider the values of our present-day techno-industrial lifeworld and the shallow ecological position and develop an idea of crisis. In the second, the reductionist paradigm of an unsustainable drive for ever-increasing material standards of living will be broken down with a constitutive analysis of the lifeworld as the lost ground of this position, which is analogous to Husserl's exposition of the crisis from the standpoint of scientific idealization. Here there will also be some discussion of a gestalt enhanced understanding of whole-part and abstract-concrete. Finally, I will explore the new awareness that should have been attained through the first two steps and develop the position of being-with non-human nature.
Many of us have seen or heard (or participated in, for that matter) a band performance at a concert or festival. This phenomenon presents itself to our consciousness as a part of our lifeworld. Likewise, the student participants bring their own experiences to the phenomenon, and create their own experiences as they exist as a part of the phenomenon as it occurs in time, making it distinctly personal and meaningful for each of them in unique ways. While we see and hear the performers on the stage, do we really understand the true nature of the phenomenon as lived by the students? What is the lived experience of these high school students as they prepare music for an adjudicated performance?

While there are many lenses through which the phenomenon of music preparation and music making has been explored, a relatively untapped aspect of this phenomenon is the experience as lived by the students themselves. How do we gain access to and begin to understand the lived experience of these students as they “experience music making?” This study attempts to render and understand the experience of high school band students as they prepare music for an adjudicated performance.

The essence of the musical experience is at once too simple and too complex to be reduced effectively to its component parts if one is seeking to truly get inside the phenomenon from an experiential standpoint. Reimer (2003) speaks of the frustrating gap found between what language is capable of meaning and what music is capable of meaning. He posits that although language can “help us and
our students get closer to the brink of the mystery… it cannot take us beyond. Only musical experience can.” Mikel Dufrenne (1973) writes that “Music provides us with an example of an art that is nonrepresentational and of an essentially temporal nature. Music unveils a world invisible to the eye, undemonstrable to the intellect. Yet this world can be expressed only by music, for it is a world which vanishes once the music ends. “

Two metaphorical constructs, one visual, one musical, provide a uniquely divergent yet inclusive and complimentary structure around which I will pursue a fresh exploration of the experiences of band students as they prepare for an adjudicated performance. Thinking from a visual paradigm, just as a prism refracts a single color of light into a full spectrum of shades or visual varietals, views from within this experience can illumine a wide variety of colorful and vibrant perspectives and uncover both divergent and convergent aspects of a uniquely personal multisensory experience. Examined from an auditory paradigm, the concept of polyphony, multiple contrasting voices working independently yet harmoniously toward a unified musical product, has enormous potential for enabling understandings of the multiplicity of experiences inherent in large ensemble performance. The complementary perspectives generated from these divergent paradigms will guide my exploration into the lived experience of high school band students as they prepare for an adjudicated performance.
This presentation will elucidate a key component of phenomenological methodology - the epoché - which is too often taken for granted, misunderstood, or neglected in qualitative research and the secondary literature. It calls for a renewed appreciation of the epoché and the phenomenological reduction in light of current scholarship that restores Husserl’s understanding of transcendental subjectivity as always an embodied subjectivity adhered to the lifeworld – not at all a transcendentalism. Furthermore the essay comments on how mundane versions of the epoché permeate everyday life (Schutz) and how the methodological epoché shares elements in common with contemplative meditation traditions across cultures. The essay concludes with an affirmation of the epoché as more than an intellectual operation, but as an action involving the entirety of the person in the manner of an ethos.
As a writer, I find moments when no words come, when a blinking cursor, a blank page, are daunting objects of frustration. As a runner, I know when I find myself bound to wordlessness, movement is a way to release jammed words, blocked thoughts. If I can not write, all I must do is tie on my shoes and go. As my feet carry me, my thoughts become free. I may sprint, kicking my way onto the bike path, along the river, between the trees, through fields and woods. Fifteen minutes in, as my breath evens, the world begins to soften, the nameless blocking factor fades. The block falls away, and the words come like breath, pouring in like water.

As a classroom English teacher, I watched high school students as I asked them to write. Large boys crammed into small desks contorted their faces in frustration and said “I can't.” I knew they could, but I did not know how to help them; I knew that, for me, the best way to write was to set myself in motion: body movement would open a thinking flow. However, the classroom environment in which we (my students and I) were caged and confined would not permit the kind of meditative motion I, an experienced writer, needed to write; my less experienced students were equally bound to wordless anxiety. From this dilemma arose questions: What can I do to help students move and, in doing so, write more freely? How does moving meditation stimulate the flow of thoughts and words for myself and other writers? What is the lived experience of moving meditation for finding flow in thinking and writing?

Born in Merleau-Ponty’s interworld, writing from the body speaks of and from the soul. By starting from this very personal phenomenon, and moving toward a common understanding of the phenomenon as it resides in other bodies, I
endeavor to eke out a sense of how moving meditation may inspire in other writers and learners a productive flow like the one I find in its practice.

The paper I intend to present will explore the lived experience of moving meditation for finding a thinking and writing flow. In the dissertation proposal planning stages, this exploration focuses upon moving meditation as a thinking and writing tool, drawing from the tradition of walking writers and from meditative physical practices such as running, walking, and yoga. I begin with my experiences as a running writer, turning toward the phenomenon to illuminate the practice of writing from and with the body. Preliminary conversations with other writers and practitioners of moving meditation uncover the presence of this phenomenon in other lives, as well. This work begins dialogue with the philosophical groundings of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Gadamer, as well as Levin, Lakoff and Johnson, and various other theorists who discuss embodiment, body Being in the world. As a beginning phenomenologist, I hope to receive direction and feedback through this presentation, as well as offering a contribution to the conversation.
The problem of suffering and its relationship to patient decision making and agency for seriously ill patients at the end of life has not been well explored in the social science and medical literature. The conceptual frameworks of suffering that have been advanced and widely accepted have not sufficiently attended to the social, interpersonal, developmental, and spiritual dimensions of suffering. The aim of this phenomenological study was to investigate the structure of suffering experiences of seriously ill persons in an urban nursing home community as a basis for more humanistic and collaborative practice across disciplines.

The results of in-depth individual interviews with six participants reveal three temporal moments in lived experiences of suffering, originating in the maternal dimensions of existence as the ground of agency, sociality and spiritual well-being. The second temporal moment of loss of the maternal ground and meaningful home environment thrust the participants into a vortex of pain and suffering as they transitioned to the nursing home. This moment was constituted by multiple experiences of loss involving the denial to participants of empathic, compassionate care to relieve the burdens of illness; distancing from meaningful relations with family, caregivers and community; dislocation from the home and immersion in an alienating realm of suffering that was unwelcoming; and communication breakdowns with professional caregivers that heightened the participants’ emotional responses to their pain and suffering experiences. The most pervasive experience of loss for the participants was the loss of agency.
The third temporal moment for participants revealed itself as a struggle to live with life-limiting and threatening conditions, to recover one’s agency and to achieve a sense of spiritual well-being at the end of life. End-of-life decision making was a type of agency founded on participants’ relational and communicative experiences in the nursing home. Types of treatment decisions made by participants included routine decisions about medications, and major decisions such as significant changes in goals of care and refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Disabled or collapsed agency compromised the participants’ involvement in decision making about their care and their coping with prolonged suffering experiences.

These findings about the structure of lived experiences of suffering are illuminating because they deepen our understanding of suffering and end-of-life decision making. These study findings suggest that participants experienced suffering as interembodied and fundamentally social, involving recall and re-enactment of the maternal ground and its transactional dimensions. Participants revealed their desires for transcendence as they struggled to reconstitute their agency and find spiritual meaning in this third temporal moment. Participants who were successful in recovery of the maternal ground, their agency and spiritual well-being were able to embrace their end of life and configure a future in which they would find hope and rest.
This presentation and paper presents the philosophical concepts of Edmund Husserl and explores the phenomenological project of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as I have sought to render them in a series of large-scale photographic artworks. As a creative visual artist, I disclose the possibilities of Husserl’s image-consciousness as perceived through Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the embodied viewer in intimate communion with the world. The overwhelming size of the photographic pieces, physical characteristics within the artwork and amount of movement required for the viewing an image comprehensively places emphasis on the phenomenological theories as embedded within or illuminated by the artwork. Whether it is one image or the entire body of work, all are considered as part of a predetermined horizon or world that can only be constituted by the embodied viewer as his or her consciousness and world are synthesized or intertwined.

By building upon Husserl’s theories on the phenomenological constitution of an object and his specific work with image-consciousness, the diverse structures of a contemporary image-consciousness are realized photographically in my artwork. His sketches, collected works and lectures provide a foundation of knowledge beyond traditional and contemporary photographic theory. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty’s writings on phenomenology, perception, embodiment and the visible/invisible have strengthened my ability to create diverse structures of meaning in images throughout an exhibition of artwork. His ideas of body schema, flesh and chiasm are directly incorporated into the physical reality and aesthetic experience of my work. As artist, I realize that focusing on the relationship of
sense perception and reflecting upon those perceptions can clarify the entire visual field of awarenesses required to work successfully in contemporary art. The placement of perceptual consciousness within the viewer’s mind/body provides for an acceptance of an exhibition space as a controlled world through the use of provisional bracketing and the projection or co-intention of possible meanings as co-constituted on a horizon pre-delineated by the artist. Within the photographic image and body of work, the deciphering of both image-consciousness and an aesthetic experience become a continuous process of perceiving, sensing and constituting. As within Merleau-Ponty’s dialogue of flesh where all forms of perception intertwine, the potential for meaning can therefore be considered inexhaustible as the viewer’s perceptual experience escalates from a plurality of interpretations.

Through documentation of the individual photographic pieces and the artwork as exhibited, this presentation focuses on the artwork as created, by myself as artist, for interaction by an embodied viewer. Additionally, as a phenomenologist, I am able to demonstrate how I expand the traditional Husserlian methodology on image-consciousness by applying Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of body schema, flesh and chiasm in the creation of the pieces. Through image, light and translucency, the texture of the world visually makes itself known within the artwork. Ultimately, the presentation will demonstrate phenomenology as a philosophical foundation used to enhance the entire visual field of awarenesses required to translate the intangible moment found in an aesthetic perceptual encounter of these specific images.
Early on in the phenomenological movement the problem of history became a source of serious reflection and concern. Both Husserl and Heidegger pick up on Dilthey’s distinction between *Geistwissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft* and observe that the defining feature of all *Geistwissenschaften* is historical constitution. For Husserl the Life-world, and for Heidegger the world of circumspect understanding, are historically constituted and enjoy a sort of phenomenological priority. This paper examines the nature of the science of history through these competing conceptions. Both also believe that the sense of history can be lost or forgotten, and argue that we as agents of history have a responsibility that entails a deliberate retrieval of sense (Husserl) or authentic historicity (Heidegger). Both further argue that the study of history involves retrieving past modes of understanding or ways of being and appropriating those as one’s own—ultimately, as one’s own in light of the destiny of a peoples or civilization. I address a specific paradox or inconsistency that threatens to rupture this version of historical responsibility. I look at several different historical texts--both ancient and modern--and compare some of the practices of actual historians to the conception of historical sense retrieval as established by Husserl and Heidegger. I argue that there is a crucial difference between what one does, and what one understands oneself to be doing, a difference that grows larger as time—history—passes. To illustrate: By crossing the Rubicon in 49 bce, Caesar most likely intended only to save his proconsulship and protect himself from prosecution, but what he *did* was bring an end to the Roman Republic. The
paradox alluded to in my title is that both Husserl and Heidegger suggest that in order to understand an event like this historically, one would need to appropriate as one’s own (facing what Gadamer would later term ‘effective history’, *Wirkungsgeschichte*) the *sense* of that event. The question is, this sense something that is grounded in phenomenology? In other words, is sense of Caesar’s action grounded in the subjective or intersubjective modes of Caesar’s being, in Caesar as a case of Dasein, or in some other way. One potential way out of this problem is to appeal to a trans-subjective *Geist* in the manner of Kant’s Nature or Hegel’s World-Spirit. However, both Heidegger and Husserl rule out this sort of solution.
Wall Street and Main Street have become opposed icons in narratives of the financial meltdown in fall 2008 and the Great Recession that followed. In many such narratives, Wall Street denizens are said to have brought on the economic collapse in which ordinary Main Streeters are the unwitting victims – collateral damage.

In the paper, I want to suggest that Schutzian phenomenology affords a way of understanding the life-world of Main Street – in particular, the lived experience of the economic – in contrast to the rarefied world of finance symbolized by Wall Street. The paper offers one way to understand the connection of the two Streets and how the collapse occurred. This paper is not conceived as a contribution to Schutzian scholarship. I have mined Schutzian texts to glean phenomenological evidence and insight regarding the things themselves.

The paper begins with a description of the two life-worlds, Main Street and Wall Street. It then shows how each represents – at an epistemic and ontological level – a different way of knowing and relating to individuals and things in the phenomenon of exchange, which is taken as the defining phenomenon of the economic domain. Lastly, the paper sketches an explanation of how Main Street became implicated in Wall Street and why the connection proved disastrous.

Main Street represents an economic world of embodied subjects who inhabit a common space in real time and engage in face-to-face encounters and communication. In exchange – e.g., negotiating the sale of a house -- the
interlocutors bring their because-of motives, deriving from their respective biographical situations, to the site of their encounter. Likewise, their in-order-to projects frame their actions and inter-actions with others. When two projects intersect at the site of a thing of common interest, discourse seeks a way that allows each to proceed with her project in a way agreeable to the other.

Wall Street, by contrast, is “wherever” financial products are traded. Buyers and sellers do not meet in face-to-face encounters. They are anonymous players in locations remote from the site of exchange. Their exchange is mediated in several ways. Brokers and market makers on the floor of the exchange may serve as human intermediaries. Asking and offering are not situated negotiating gestures by the ultimate buyers and sellers but rather are mediated by asking and offering prices which are framed by other prices and become the stuff of arbitrage by middle-men.

Main Street and Wall Street, then, represent two very different worlds. Ultimately, the difference between them is epistemic and ontological, rooted in a distinction that Alfred Schutz takes over from Edmund Husserl: that between problematic and open possibilities. The paper offers a detailed examination of the distinction and its application to exchange.

The paper concludes by suggesting how – phenomenologically speaking -- the fate of Main Street gets tied to practices of Wall Street. The economist’s account translates phenomenologically as one of the genesis and constitution of higher-order meanings, built upon many levels of founded and founding meanings but ultimately rooted in the life-world or lived experience. When the meaning fundament is obscured and then forgotten, the entire construct is in jeopardy, a crash or meltdown is the unhappy result.
Phenomenological psychopathology has a long and distinguished history that began with the work of Jaspers early in the 20th century. In the 21st century, this tradition continues to provide an alternative to the dominant medical model that accounts for quantifiable symptoms with fragmentary correlational research and incommensurate etiological theories. The present research addressed the incompleteness and fragmentation in the study of Bulimia Nervosa (BN) by using rigorous sampling techniques, extensive descriptions of the lived experiences of persons with BN, and phenomenological analyses of the typical structures of the life historical development of BN symptoms.

Although mainstream psychopathology reliably diagnoses bulimic psychopathology, the criteria have emphasized quantifiable behavioral frequency (e.g., of binging and purging) and have not provided a complete conceptualization of the psychological disorder. Correlational studies have identified such associated factors as sociotropy, dissociation, and anger but have offered no knowledge of how these factors are related to each other. Although supported by research, etiological theories emphasizing psychodymanics, family systems, sociocultural values, and cognitive behavioral learning have remained at odds with each other and fail to form an integrated body of knowledge. Moreover, researchers still debate whether individuals with ‘subclinical’ bulimia nervosa (SCBN), whose symptoms are too infrequent to meet diagnostic criteria, are at risk for developing the disorder and are similar to or different from those who meet the diagnostic
criteria. The present study attempted to solve these problems with a holistic and comprehensive comparison of the life historical development of symptoms that met diagnostic criteria (BN) with that of symptoms that were too infrequent to meet clinical levels (SCBN).

After psychometric assessments of 322 undergraduate students for eating disorders, individual interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with 20 (19 females, 1 male) classified as having BN (4), SCBN (9), and no eating disorder (6). By studying these individuals’ lived experiences in their historical context, the investigation went beyond the number of behavioral indicators and empathically reflected on their psychological meanings and genetic structure. Detailed, in-depth phenomenological analyses of the development of binging and purging revealed two very different typical structures among individuals with BN and those with SCBN. Individuals with clinical BN were engaged in an unsuccessful lifelong struggle with profound loneliness, isolation, and emptiness in face of consistent abandonment and neglect. With a virtual social invisibility emergent in adolescence, they desperately sought comfort and love through their isolated binging and purging. In contrast, individuals with SCBN successfully achieved belonging and self esteem by the perfectionistic fulfillment of others’ values but intermittently faced rejection by those on whom their esteem depended. When their social acceptance was threatened, they numbed their disturbing emotions, achieved gratification, and yet maintained attractiveness by binging and purging. The analysis found family relationships, poor body image, comfort, sociotropy, dissociation, and feelings of anger to be significant and essential constituents the life-historical development of both BN and SCBN; however, these common themes differed in their meanings within their respective holistic structures.
The phenomenological descriptions of the two typical structures of BN psychopathology offered support for all the existing research and theories on BN by elucidating the data of lived experiences to which they refer. This phenomenological psychopathology demonstrated numerous limits and deficiencies of the extant knowledge, supplemented prior research with original findings, and integrated disparate theories within more comprehensive structural understandings. This study offers insight into the significant relapse rate after psychotherapies limited to symptom reduction and suggests more fitting outcome criteria for psychotherapeutic success based on the more complete, phenomenological understanding of individuals’ lived experience.
The relationship between the fields of geology and aesthetics has been described as the area of study referred to as Geoaesthetics. Geoaesthetics according to one definition is defined as “aesthetics defined by natural geological processes, such as rocks, or by man, when he uses geological elements or concepts to produce art.” (Toni Eerola, ‘Geoaesthetics and its Applications’, International Geological Congress, Oslo 2008).

One area into which Geoaesthetics may be extended is what we can call Geoarchitecture. This can be defined as a discipline that would link geology and architecture. One avenue for linking Geoaesthetics and Geoarchitecture is biomimcry.

Following Janine Benyus 3 definitions of biomimcry as developed in her book Biomimcry (Perennial press2002):

1. Nature as model
2. Nature as measure
3. Nature as mentor

My analysis will attempt to develop a theory of Geoarchitectural design employing the phenomenological theories of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau – Ponty. At the core of this theory will be a discussion how phenomenology offers crucial insights for developing projects through the notions of biomimicry and Geoarchitectural design based upon it, as well as developing ideas related to a reconsideration of sustainable design.
The reconsideration of the concepts of sustainable design and Geoarchitecture will use the following ideas of Husserl, Lifeworld, Natural Attitude, Epoche and Wholes and Parts analysis as well as Heidegger’s notion of hermeneutics. In addition I shall also use Merleau – Ponty’s notion of the “body subject” to develop the concept of Geoarchitecture.

Central to a reconsideration of the ideas of sustainable design and Geoarchitecture is the idea that a fundamental shift in outlook must be made in fields such as civil engineering. This shift in outlook will involve a movement from a quantitatively based analysis, to a qualitative phenomenologically based foundation, in order to develop an environmentally sound theory of sustainable design.
PANELS

PANEL 1

Title: New Movements in Interdisciplinary Phenomenology: Jacqueline M. Martinez’ Communicative Sexualities: A Communicology of Sexual Experience

CHAIR: Richard L. Lanigan, Communicology
International Communicology Institute

RESPONDENTS:
1. Richard L. Lanigan, Communicology, International Communicology Institute
2. Maureen Connolly, Communicology, Brock University
3. Lisa M. Anderson, Women and Gender Studies, Arizona State University

PANEL ABSTRACT

Jacqueline M. Martinez’ Communicative Sexualities: A Communicology of Sexual Experience, provides an argument for and illustration of how to pursue the direct study of students’ lived-experiences of sexuality in a classroom or academic setting. It illustrates how Communicology, and its methodological practice of semiotic phenomenology, allows for a sustained and rigorous study of the meaningfulness of sexual experience as it becomes manifest in the immediate, concrete and embodied realities in the lives of those taking up such a study. The generous use of extended examples from actual classroom experience allows for a detailed consideration of the applied research methodology, as well as the ethical issues involved in making students’ lived-experience of sexuality the main subject
matter of the course. A major concern of the book is to make explicit the many presuppositions about sex, gender and sexuality that students and professors bring into the classroom. It considers the steps necessary in suspending presuppositions regarding sexuality and gender, and focuses particular attention on the many presuppositions associated with the heterosexual-homosexual binary. Sexuality is understood as inherently good, yet as capable of becoming a means of perpetuating human isolation and degradation as much as an experience of tremendously shared human intimacy and mutual recognition. Discussions of historical context, the fact of temporality, and the intersection of person and culture provide a basis for explicit discussions of semiotics and phenomenology in communicology. As an introductory text, Communicative Sexualities is an excellent primer for the advanced study of communicology and semiotic phenomenology. It one of very few texts that provides both a theoretical or philosophical discussion of phenomenology with the study of sexuality and gender as an explicit subject matter.

Three advanced scholars with expertise in Communicology and Women and Gender Studies will proved critical commentary on the work, followed by the author’s response.

1. “Sexuality: Consciousness of Individuality Confronts the Silence of Culture”
   Richard Lanigan

   In his lectures on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Alexandre Kojève guides a whole generation of French philosophers (and us) in the phenomenological understanding that “[Hu]man’s definitive satisfaction, which
completes History, necessarily implies consciousness of individuality that has been realized (by universal recognition of particularity)” and that “a historical free individual … attains fullness of consciousness of a self that no longer has any reason to negate itself and become other”. I propose to illustrate the core problematic and thematic of Jacqueline M. Martinez’s book *Communicative Sexualities* as the discovery of the “consciousness of individuality” that no longer “negates itself”. The problematic is the “silence of culture” which teaches that sexuality cannot be a visible referent in public discourse, with the consequence that intersubjective consciousness is inarticulate on the subject matter. The discovery of Self and Other in Sexuality can be thematized with the institutional securities of an open-mined pedagogy of interpersonal communication and a curriculum that teaches the discourse of self description as social identity. Martinez offers us such a pedagogy and curriculum. I use Joseph Luft’s “Johari Window” Model (Joe and Harry have a transparent dialogue about body and body image for self and other) to illustrate how she teaches us to breaks the cultural silence with our express sexuality.

2. //???//

Maureen Connolly

I propose responding to Martinez’s intriguing and thought–provoking text from several perspectives that I believe are resonant with her project. I will discuss the overall approach to the study of sexuality (ie, semiotic phenomenology/communicology) as it pertains to a) stressed embodiment in the form of disabled or “transgressive” bodies, in particular how these might both
unsettle and affirm Martinez’s propositions; b) pedagogy, and especially pedagogies wherein students’ experiences are a vital component of the teaching and learning experience (here I expect to draw on the work of Paulo Freire and bell hooks), and in particular in situations where teachers and learners themselves might be survivors of sexual assault; and c) methodology in practical applications and especially as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of attentive wonder.

3. Communicology as Feminist Research Method

Lisa M. Anderson

*Communicative Sexualities* offers original insight into the study of sexuality. This paper will discuss the ways in which communicology and semiotic phenomenology, in this text especially, are tools for feminist research into sexuality studies. Because it deals with the lived body, and lived experience, Martinez’s text creates a space and potential to study sexuality while avoiding the moralizing and presumptions that can be, and often are, unconscious or subtextual even in feminist studies of sexuality as it is lived and experienced.
PANEL 2

TITLE: Show Me a Sign: A Phenomenology of bodily Expression at the Intersection of Deaf and Hearing Cultures

Thomas D. Craig: Communicology, Disability Studies
Maureen Connolly: Physical Education, Disability Studies
Jonathan Parsons: English

The members of this panel will explore how meanings are made with bodily expressive forms and functions at the intersections of deaf and hearing cultures. Examples include gestural, movement, and poetic expressions across space, body, time and language. Each author approaches the exploration with a particularity of body/text performance which implicates language as a problematic -- not a conduit -- of communication. We use the word problematic here in the more embodied sense of ongoing tension between body and world, an aporia which resists formulaic or protocolled solutions, or even the formulation of such engagements with those terms at all, as things requiring, or in need of, solutions. Indeed, the problematic of expressing could be intertwined with the call of a desire to express.

We will use Michael Davidson’s (2006) article, “Hearing Things: The Scandal of Speech in Deaf Performance” and the videotaped poetry performance to which he refers throughout the article and their poem “I am ordered now to talk” (by the Flying Words Project duo, Peter Cook and Kenny Learner). The article and the performance are the contexts for our respective engagements that
we believe will constitute a robust and multifaceted (poetic, movement expressive, political-communicative-cultural) phenomenological exploration.

“**This body I call mine as transgressive sign**”

Author A will explore the notion of the scandal of expression in deaf and hearing interactions when the *corps propre* (“this body I call mine”) is taken as transgressive sign. The presentation will examine the constitutive elements of embodied transgression and how deaf and hearing bodies are read, misread and dismissed by unspoken signs and the normalization of speech and hearing themselves. The author asks a series of questions designed to interrogate the intersection of space, body, time, language, in the context of Davidson’s (ibid.) suggestion that American Sign Language is a powerful Deaf counter-discourse to the hegemony of speaking-hearing. What are the signs of that non/hearing body that does not fit normative expectations, that unsettles cultural assumptions of speech and silence? How are communities of common understandings aware of who belongs and who does not and how are these boundaries policed? What are the implications for those being policed and those doing the policing, and how are these roles reciprocal, reflexive, and interchangeable? How are cultural-linguistic communities formed around shared inclusion and exclusion? What happens with bodily expressions such as Cook and Lerner’s poetic performances that cross over Deaf and hearing communities, that disrupt and embrace distinct cultural categories?

“**Choreological explorations of carnal poetics**”
Author B will build on previous phenomenological work in expressive movement and semiotic choreology, exploring how thematized and spontaneous movement sequences (functional and expressive) can be observed, analyzed and refined to disclose and deepen meaning with/in textual and other expressive modalities. Poetizing need not be limited to written or spoken word and meaning can reside in a felt sense, known and expressed carnally and made accessible for a broad range of embodiments and forms of meaning making. The intersections of Laban’s existential movement categories and the life-world existential thematics of phenomenology will form the framework by which the elements of Deaf poetry performance will be described, appreciated and explored.

“Form, Content and Function: Phenomenology and/in Sign Language Poetry”

Author C will take up poetry as a creative process that disrupts expressive forms and functions of language. Sign language poetry speaks in its own way. As poetry expressed with an embodied spatial grammar, it contests even this sense that language should *speak*. Poetry, in this light, is more than lines that stop before the end of the page. Poetic process unhinges fixed meanings and presents language as a problem. Cook and Learner’s poem opens up a rift in language. The unsettling collision of temporal-verbal and spatial-embodied sign systems disrupts taken-for-granted notions of language, offering itself as a site of phenomenological reflection. “I Am Ordered Now to Talk” will be described with reference to other poetic engagements that similarly problematize language, such as Joyce’s *Finnegan’s Wake*, ee Cumming’s spatial poetry, and the spoken word tradition of Ginsberg and other Beat Generation poets. The paper will ground a phenomenological understanding of language and poetry in Kristeva’s *Revolution*
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Panel 3
Panel Title: Amedeo Giorgi’s Phenomenological Method: Radical Movement in Psychology

Chair:
Thomas F. Cloonan, Fordham University, tcloonan@fordham.edu

Presenters:
1. Christopher M. Aanstoos, University of West Georgia, aanstoos@westga.edu
2. Mufid James Hannush, Rosemont College, mjhannush@rosemont.edu
3. James Morley, Ramapo College, jmorley@ramapo.edu
4. Frederick J. Wertz, Fordham University, wertz@fordham.edu

The presenters in this panel are authors of chapters in the recent Festschrift volume, *The Redirection of Psychology: Essays in Honor of Amedeo P. Giorgi*, edited by panelist Tom Cloonan and Christian Thiboutot. This panel will discuss the most recent and thorough presentation of Amedeo Giorgi’s contributions to the methodology of phenomenological psychology in his 2009 book, *The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology: A Modified Husserlian Approach*, and two applications of the research method developed by Giorgi. First, the historical context of Giorgi’s confrontation with the problem of articulating a phenomenological research method for general psychology will be reviewed. Attention will be given to the modifications of Husserl’s philosophical method that were required by the demands of psychological subject matter and scientific concerns. A succinct comparison of Giorgi’s phenomenological psychology and phenomenological philosophy will be offered. Then, an analysis of the positioning of Giorgi’s phenomenological psychology within the history and systems of
psychology will be delineated. The radicality of Giorgi’s approach to psychology will become clear through the contrast of his phenomenological approach with other schools of psychology in Continental Europe and the US. Next, pedagogy concerning Giorgi’s research method will focus on an exploration of the integration of phenomenology into the research methods curriculum in psychology. In particular, this presentation will address teaching students to collect descriptions, identify meaning units, perform psychological analytic thematizations, articulate situated psychological structures, and holistically describe general structures of psychological life. Finally, two applications of Giorgi’s research method will briefly demonstrate its utility. The first application is a research project investigating the effects of art education on the experience of a painting. This analysis of aesthetic experience was based on three research participants’ experiences of a painting, described in interviews, before and after art/aesthetics instruction. The second application is the study of personal biography, in particular a psychological phenomenological investigation of the founder of the Behaviorist school of psychology, John B. Watson, based on an interview with his son, James B. Watson.
1. On the History of Qualitative Research
Christopher M. Aanstoos, University of West Georgia, Psychology,
aanstoos@westga.edu

This paper offers an evaluative overview of Amedeo Giorgi’s analysis of the history of qualitative research in psychology. It reflects upon his analysis especially in the light of his project to establish the historical breadth and varieties of that tradition. A particular focus is Giorgi’s understanding of the bases for the recursive failures of such historical efforts to have been more widely influential in psychology.

2. Reflections on the Application of the Phenomenological Method to Understanding the Link Between the Life and Work of John B. Watson
Mufid James Hannush, Rosemont College, Psychology, mjhannush@rosemont.edu

This part of the panel will provide a second demonstration of the application of Giorgi’s human science research method in psychology. It will involve a brief presentation of an exemplary psychological study of personal biography, in particular an investigation of the founder of the psychological school of Behaviorism, John B. Watson, based on an interview with his son, James B. Watson.

3. Teaching Giorgi’s Descriptive Method
This presentation will briefly introduce the pedagogy concerning Giorgi’s research method will focus on an exploration of the integration of phenomenology into the research methods curriculum in psychology. In particular, this presentation will address teaching the collection of descriptions, the demarcation of meaning units, psychological analytic thematization, the articulation of situated structures, and the description of holistic general structures.

4. Giorgi’s Utilization and Adaptation of Phenomenological Philosophy for Human Science Psychology
Frederick J. Wertz, Fordham University, Psychology, wertz@fordham.edu

This part of the panel will focus on Giorgi’s appropriation of the insights and methods of phenomenological philosophy in crafting a new approach and method for human science psychology. Special attention will be given to the challenges facing psychology and the modifications of Husserl’s philosophical method that were required by the demands of psychological subject matter and scientific concerns. The centrality of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “structure” for human science psychology will be included. A brief comparison of Giorgi’s phenomenological psychology and phenomenological philosophy will be offered in order to stimulate discussion.